View of the petrochemical plant, oil refinery, and housing complex in Aliağa. Credit: Başak CanWhen Causality Swirls: Toxic Uncertainty in Industrial Aliağa
The smell arrived in the middle of our interview. I was sitting in the trade union’s local center in Aliağa, on İzmir’s northern edge, three days into a preliminary study of industrial pollution and health. İbrahim is a retired petrochemical operator, a two-term union branch chair, and now an opposition member of the municipal council. We were sitting about seven hundred meters from the main entrance of the refineries. In the middle of a sentence he stopped, lifted his head slightly, and asked: “Did you smell it?” Then he named the smell. He told me which compound it was, which unit it had probably come from, and which wind had carried it to where we were sitting. He finished his sentence, and we carried on. I had caught the smell a moment after he did. That evening my head ached badly, and it did so the following evening and the one after that, for the whole week I spent in the district.
What follows is not an argument that the air in Aliağa is bad. It is an argument about what happens to causal reasoning, and therefore to responsibility, in a place where the air is bad for many different reasons. It is also an effort to grapple with a puzzle that recurs across industrial zones: people who know they are being harmed neither leave nor build the environmental health movements that the literature would predict. Aliağa has unions with real power, an educated professional class, an opposition municipal group, and a population that can describe its own exposure in fine detail. It does not have an environmental health justice movement of any comparable strength. I want to suggest that this is not a deficit of knowledge, courage, or organisation, but a consequence of how causality is distributed here.
Aliağa was once a coastal town and a small port. Industrial development began with a paper mill, followed by the establishment of Tüpraş’s refinery in the early 1970s and the Petkim petrochemical complex, which reached full production in the mid-1980s. Since then, came two thermal power stations; fuel and gas storage and filling terminals; twenty-three ship-recycling yards, making Aliağa one of the largest ship-breaking sites in the world; a belt of electric-arc steel mills fed partly by the scrap those yards produce; chemical and plastics plants. The town has grown with the industry. İbrahim, who does the municipal budget arithmetic himself, points out that Aliağa has roughly the same annual budget as Gebze with a quarter of Gebze’s population, another important industrial hub in Turkey. By his reckoning, it has the highest per-capita municipal revenue in Turkey. The district now has around 105,000 people, and everyone I spoke to expects it to grow.
I grew up close to the area. I spent my childhood summers in a small bay across the water from the petrochemical plant, and over those years I watched the sea urchins and starfish disappear. The water foamed for more days each summer. None of it seemed to require explanation at the time; it was simply what the bay did. It was only after my mother was diagnosed with cancer that I began to think about the what-ifs. What if it was because of the furniture my grandfather had rescued from the ship-breaking yards down the coast, near the petrochemical plant, and brought into the house? What if it was because of the sea she liked to swim in? What about the water she used to shower, wash clothes, and wash dishes—the water that came from a place with no sewage drainage system? The suspicion was unprovable, and I knew it even as I formed it. But it left me with a question that I carried into the field: how could anyone living here fail to link their illness to the plants? I have been grappling with this question ever since. I would like to reflect on my initial field visit to Aliağa, this time as an ethnographer, to explore it.
What struck me most in my initial interviews was how the industrial density in the region makes attribution extraordinarily difficult. Every expert I met in Aliağa had a causal theory of pollution. Each explanation was technically plausible, empirically grounded in experience, and advanced in good faith. The physician, who had been inside the thermal plant and inside oil refinery, described both plants as astonishingly well controlled and regulated. The real problem, he said, was the thing nobody counts: iron dust from the steel mills. An environmental engineer who had spent two and a half months managing waste at a ship-breaking yard told me that the refinery and petrochemical operators were the ones who regulated pollution meticulously. The district’s principal polluters, she argued, were the scrap-fed steel mills: scrap is contaminated by definition, and what comes out of an electric-arc furnace charged with painted, oiled, rusted metal contains hazardous substances. A contractor who runs maintenance crews inside the refinery went further. “Refineries, let me put it plainly, are the cleanest facilities here.” The product is expensive, he explained, so the plant is expensive, and the attention to pollution is correspondingly serious. He named steel, industrial gases, and ship-breaking instead. An officer of the petrochemical workers’ union, no friend of any employer, said much the same thing: “The real problem is iron and steel. There’s no inspection there at all.”
These are serious judgments by people with direct knowledge. But taken together, they form a peculiar circle of deferral. Responsibility moves from one industrial sector to another, and ultimately toward whichever sector is perceived to be least regulated. The problem is not that nobody has a theory of pollution. The problem is that everybody has one, and no apparatus exists that can adjudicate among them. In Türkiye that absence is partly designed: environmental impact assessment is formally required but routinely waived for projects designated strategic, which is to say for exactly the installations whose cumulative effects would need assessing. Auyero and Swistun (2009), writing about a shantytown wedged against a petrochemical complex outside Buenos Aires, described the “toxic uncertainty” that takes hold when companies, doctors, lawyers, and officials offer contradictory accounts, leaving residents unsure not only whom to trust but what to make of their own bodily experience. Aliağa seems to suggest a different form of toxic uncertainty. Here nobody needs to manufacture doubt. Industrial density produces it as a by-product. The uncertainty does not arise because all accounts are equally implausible. It arises because several accounts can be plausible at once.
The cases that founded environmental justice scholarship and environmental justice politics — Love Canal, Woburn, Warren County, Bhopal — were what Vincanne Adams (2023) calls enclosed exposures: a discrete substance, a bounded site, an identifiable defendant, a plume you could draw on a map. That model underwrites the science (attributable fractions, exposure–response curves) and the politics (the lawsuit, the class action, the demand for a health study) equally. Aliağa is more like what Adams, following glyphosate across the food system, calls a great swirl: substances, effects, and structural inequalities in continuous circulation, entering bodies from too many directions to be disentangled. In dialogue with Murphy’s (Murphy, 2006) discussion of “regimes of perceptibility,” we can argue that the question is not simply what people can perceive, but what technical and institutional arrangements make perceptible forms of harm count as evidence. The state operates one monitoring station in Aliağa, sited where the breeze is best. Its public dashboard reports the air; whenever I look at it, it says the air quality in Aliağa is “satisfying,” posing no risk. The municipality does not measure it either. Despite employing environmental engineers, the municipality has no public record of any measurement of pollution in the air, soil, or water. At the national level, the Ministry of Health has not released regional cancer or occupational-accident figures for the last seven years. A staff member in the district health directorate’s cancer-screening unit told me she was unaware of the latest numbers. Even associating death with Aliağa is difficult. People from Aliağa are diagnosed and die at oncology units in İzmir city centre, and their deaths are recorded there. The district’s own mortality profile therefore remains clean. What is missing is not perception. It is the apparatus that would convert perception into evidence, and evidence into an attributable claim: accessible mortality data, an epidemiological programme, and the occupational-disease statistics.
It is tempting to stop there, with the familiar demand that the state measure what it refuses to measure. But that demand is itself a particular political form, and worth examining rather than assuming. The citizen-science and biological-citizenship projects that have shaped environmental health activism since the 1970s presuppose a hopeful relation to the state: that regulation can be improved, that a health study once commissioned will be honored, that quantification will eventually favor the exposed. They also tend to reproduce the evidentiary hierarchy privileging numeric indicators over the sensory and relational knowledge that residents actually hold. In Aliağa that hopefulness has become difficult to sustain. The state-owned industries were privalized, the state refrain from even documenting the extent of the pollution and the proliferation of industries complicated the causality.
It would be convenient if this were simply a story about poison dumped on the powerless. It is not. By nearly every account I heard, Aliağa has one of the least frightening labour markets in western Turkey. “In Aliağa you have ten rivals for a job,” a contractor told me. “In other places, you have a hundred.” What Aliağa sells is not only money but the absence of dread: the ease of not having to worry about work. A union officer put the floor monthly wage at 78,000 Turkish lira ($2,369) in the summer of 2024. Overtime pays three to five times the base rate. This is where Aliağa sits awkwardly with the environmental justice tradition. That tradition was built on the disproportionate siting of hazards in racialised, segregated, and abandoned communities on populations that were placed in harm’s way rather than drawn to it. Aliağa’s exposed population is unionized, comparatively well paid, largely arrived from elsewhere, and still growing. The injustice has not disappeared; it has changed shape. It is no longer primarily a question of who was made to live beside the plant, but of what it costs to have the best job in the region.
Not all industrial workers are that fortunate. In the ship-breaking yards, work can remain profoundly precarious: when a man is killed, his son may take his place, the family may be given a house, and the matter may be locally settled. This is what happens to responsibility when causality is dispersed. It becomes difficult to assign to a particular actor, institution, or process. Instead, it can be absorbed into arrangements that compensate, contain, or normalise harm. People also buy their way out by moving to a nearby coastal town twenty kilometres away. Some senior managers commute from the far side of the bay, while newer arrivals and middle managers live in the newly constructed, prestigious Siteler neighborhood next to the oil refinery and petrochemical plant. One interviewee told me he would not live there even if he were paid to, given the constant stench and the risk of explosion. Some blue-collar workers aspire to live in this neighborhood, while others remain in neighborhoods where former slums have been replaced by four- and five-story apartment buildings.
The dominant story about slow chemical harm is that it is invisible. However, the absence of official measurement does not mean that people are not experiencing pollution and its adverse effects. As Davies (2022) asks of slow violence: “out of sight to whom?” It is not invisible to the people living inside it. People perceive it with a precision and materiality that have diffused into their everyday lives. Canan moved to the Siteler neighborhood four hundred meters from the plant gate three years ago, when her husband took a job in the industrial zone. She described an oily film that settles on the balcony rail and the roof of the car — not dust, not soot, but something you can smear. She had already drawn the inference: “I think we’re swallowing this. I mean, doesn’t it get into our mouths?” Canan’s family drives out every summer evening at five simply to breathe, returning at midnight. “We’re running away, basically,” she said. In Horozgediği, a village beside the thermal and steel plants, in a news report, the former headman showed visitors how a white shirt hung out at night had turned grey by morning. Ayşe, who was born and raised in Aliağa, told me how she buys produce only from villages on one side of a particular ridge, and nothing from the far side, which lies closer to the factories’ landfills. She can draw the boundary with her hand. People also measure their own tolerance in time. The municipality’s environmental engineer, five years into the job, told me, “I don’t intend to stay more than another five years. I can feel myself caving in.” His child is three years into hormone treatment for early puberty. A mechanical engineer at a steel mill, newly married, told me, “I don’t want to stay more than five years, because my health is going bad.” Canan and her husband are counting down to his retirement. Many seem to have an imagined threshold of the years they are planning to stay in Aliağa as if they are provisionally resident.
I want to resist reading these practices as coping, or as what people do in the absence of real politics. Wiping a rail, drawing a line across a market, timing a drive to the coast, setting oneself a five-year limit: these are what Manuel Tironi calls hypo-interventions, intimate and unspectacular acts that constitute a form of ethical endurance in Elizabeth Povinelli’s sense. To treat them only as damage (Tuck, 2009), as the residue left where a movement should have been, is to accept in advance the evidentiary hierarchy that keeps them out of the record. My project is built on this knowledge as it is embedded in the diverse communities living in Aliağa. I have heard stories about women giving preterm birth, children suffering from asthma and other childhood diseases, and workers suffering from cancer, and I am curious about what happens to these families when they begin living with these diagnoses in Aliağa: how their understandings of disease, pollution, industry, and the causal relations among them change after receiving a diagnosis, and how they learn to live with chronic illness in a place they understand to be contaminated. This project is also about using contaminated geography as a lens through which to rethink the experience of chronic illness and to ask how illness is lived, interpreted, and acted upon when its causes are everywhere and nowhere at once.
Finally, I should note that the headwoman of Siteler told me that reports of cancer deaths in Aliağa had been exaggerated in the press. “Aliağa is no Dilovası [another industrial town that has hit the headlines for its higher cancer rates],” she said. Places establish their toxicity not only through pollutant measurements or death rates, but also relationally, by comparison with places imagined to be worse. Aliağa’s reputation can thus be defended by pointing to Dilovası. Residents recognize that toxicity is relative: a place appears more or less hazardous depending on what it is compared with. Such comparisons can normalize harm, allowing a polluted environment to be perceived as safe simply because another is more severely damaged.
Toxic uncertainty, then, does not produce a single political response. It can generate demands for measurement, practices of avoidance, plans for therapeutic migration, acceptance of occupational risk, and efforts to protect the place’s reputation. These are not stages on a road that ends in mobilization, and they are not failures to arrive there. They are what acting looks like in a permanently polluted world (Liboiron et al., 2018), where the question is no longer how to restore a clean environment but how to live, and keep living, inside a swirl that has no outside. My project will explore how families living with chronic illness hold on to each other, the healthcare system, and their own understandings of what has happened to them as they learn to live with illness in a contaminated environment where its causes can be sensed but rarely proven, and where there is no clear outside to the swirl of pollution and uncertainty.
References
Adams, V. (2023). Glyphosate and the Swirl: An Agroindustrial Chemical on the Move. Duke University Press Books.
Auyero, J., & Swistun, D. A. (2009). Flammable: Environmental suffering in an Argentine shantytown / Javier Auyero and Débora Alejandra Swistun. Oxford University Press.
Davies, T. (2022). Slow violence and toxic geographies: ‘Out of sight’ to whom? Environment and Planning C: Politics and Space, 40(2), 409–427. https://doi.org/10.1177/2399654419841063
Liboiron, M., Tironi, M., & Calvillo, N. (2018). Toxic politics: Acting in a permanently polluted world. Social Studies of Science, 48(3), 331.
Murphy, M. (2006). Sick Building Syndrome and the Problem of Uncertainty: Environmental Politics, Technoscience and Women Workers. North Carolina: Duke University Press. https://catalog.princeton.edu/catalog/99125139155706421
Tuck, E. (2009). Suspending Damage: A Letter to Communities. Harvard Educational Review, 79(3), 409–428. https://doi.org/10.17763/haer.79.3.n0016675661t3n15